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THE  VONAGE  TRILOGY:
A  CASE  STUDY  IN  “PATENT  BULLYING”
Ted Sichelman*
ABSTRACT
This Article presents an in-depth case study of a series of infringement suits filed by “patent
bullies.”  Unlike the oft-discussed “patent trolls”—which typically sell no products or services and
perform no R&D—patent bullies are large, established operating companies that threaten or
institute costly patent infringement actions of dubious merit against smaller companies, usually
in order to suppress competition or garner licensing fees.  In an ideal world of high-quality pat-
ents and optimal patent licensing and litigation, infringement suits by aggressive incumbents
would have a cleansing, almost Darwinian effect.  Yet, defects and distortions in patent exami-
nation, licensing, and litigation—the very problems that are raised constantly in the context of
patent trolls—generally apply with equal and, often, greater force to patent bullies.  Nonetheless,
patent bullies have scarcely been discussed in the academic literature or popular press, especially
in recent years.
This Article examines three patent infringement suits filed by incumbent telecommunica-
tions carriers—Sprint, Verizon, and AT&T—against Vonage, then an early-stage company pro-
viding consumer telephone services over the Internet.  Based on a detailed analysis of the patents-
at-issue, prior art, court documents, and news accounts, it shows that the incumbents were able
to exploit defects in the patent system in order to prevent disruptive technologies from competing
with their outmoded products and services.  Because startups like Vonage typically lack the
resources to vigorously defend against even weak patent suits, patent bullying can result in severe
anticompetitive effects.  The incumbents in the Vonage suits achieved their intended result—
drastically reducing Vonage’s stock price, severely weakening its position in the market, and
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placing it at the brink of insolvency.  This case study demonstrates that further theoretical and
empirical study is warranted to assess the full extent of the patent bullying problem.
INTRODUCTION: THE OVERLOOKED PROBLEM OF PATENT BULLYING
In the last ten years or so, academics, the media, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, and the Supreme Court have been fixated on so-called “patent
trolls”—loosely, entities and individuals that generate the bulk of their reve-
nue from patent litigation and licensing, but do not make and sell products
that embody their patents and that, typically, perform little to no research
and development relating to their patents.1  Yet, the exact problem trolls pre-
sent to the patent system has remained somewhat elusive.2
Many focus their attention on the non-practicing nature of trolls,
exhorting that patentholders that do not sell commercial products embody-
ing their patents are behaving contrary to the goals of the patent system.3
1 Some might characterize individual inventors or small companies that had once
performed research and development, but no longer do, as patent trolls.  In general, there
is a substantial debate over how to define the term “troll,” but all definitions appear to
require that a troll not make and sell products (at least in substantial numbers) that
embody the patents it owns. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and
Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1578
(2009) (noting that “[w]hile definitions vary, [a patent troll] in this Article refers to a
corporate patent enforcement entity that neither practices nor seeks to commercialize its
inventions”).  Focusing on the non-practicing, litigious nature of trolls, many commenta-
tors have used “non-practicing entity” (NPE) and “patent assertion entity” (PAE) as less
disparaging substitutes. See id. at 1573–74 (“Others see the rise of aggressive and opportu-
nistic enforcement of patents by non-practicing entities (‘NPEs’) against established busi-
nesses to be the real bane of the patent system.” (footnote omitted)); Christopher Anthony
Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) Under the Micro-
scope: An Empirical Investigation of Patent Holders as Litigants (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Papers Series, Paper No. 14-17, 2013), available at http://www.laipla.net/wp-content/
uploads/2013/11/CotropiaEtAlStudy.pdf (proposing a multi-category classification system
for PAEs and finding lower numbers of PAE suits in 2010 and 2012 than previously
reported in the literature).  For the reasons I present below, I think the term “troll” is
justified, but only for those NPEs that abuse the patent system by exploiting weak patents.
See infra note 17 and accompanying text.  In this regard, the current shift in terminology
may do more injustice to those NPEs and PAEs that assert strong patents—which I gener-
ally view as welfare-enhancing—than retaining the use of the “troll” term.
2 Following the dissemination of this Article online, Mark Lemley and Douglas
Melamed offered a trenchant critique of the common rhetoric of patent trolls. See Mark A.
Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117,
2129–45 (2013) (citing an earlier version of this Article) (contending that, in many
respects, practicing entities potentially generate more social costs than trolls).  However, in
contrast to this Article, Lemley and Melamed do not focus their efforts on describing how
large practicing entities abuse the patent system by “bullying” smaller practicing entities.
Instead, they ground their analysis in a comparison of the activities of practicing entities to
those of non-practicing entities. See id.
3 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328 (2010) (“Patent-assertion
entities are focused on the enforcement, rather than the active development or commer-
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However, this view is clearly wrong, at least as a descriptive matter, because
the Supreme Court has firmly held that “it is the privilege of any owner of
property [including patents] to use or not use it, without question of
motive.”4  Indeed, the most widely accepted explanation of the patent sys-
tem—the “reward theory”—posits that patents are designed to spur inven-
tion and its disclosure in patents to the public, but generally are unnecessary
to promote the commercialization of inventions.5  Instead, reward theorists
believe that once inventions are created and disclosed, the market will effi-
ciently yield commercial embodiments of those inventions.6  Although there
is a strong normative argument that the patent system should actively pro-
mote commercialization—and I am squarely in favor of this view—American
cialization of their patents.”); Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in
the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 308 (2006) (“A
number of organizations that license, but do not commercialize patents, have sprung up
with the sole purpose of asserting patents against potential infringers.”). But cf. Damien
Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, Elves or Trolls? The Role of Nonpracticing
Patent Owners in the Innovation Economy, 21 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1, 1–2 (2011) (propos-
ing a business model-neutral policy for analyzing patent licensors).
4 Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (citation omit-
ted); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (“The [dis-
trict] court’s categorical rule is also in tension with Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper
Bag Co., which rejected the contention that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant
injunctive relief to a patentholder who has unreasonably declined to use the patent.” (cita-
tion omitted)).  Although lower courts have latched onto Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
eBay to deny injunctive relief to a non-practicing patentee, see, e.g., Commw. Scientific &
Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007),
rev’d on other grounds, 542 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008), such a patentee is just as entitled to a
suitable legal remedy as a practicing entity. See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Pri-
vate Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 551–52 (2014).  Moreover, although post-eBay
denials of injunctions to non-practicing entities may be effectuating more of a commercial-
ization-oriented view of patent law, on a theoretical level, Justice Kennedy’s pronounce-
ment is analytically flawed, because he implicitly assumes without basis that non-practicing
entities enjoy “undue leverage in negotiations” involving complex technologies while prac-
ticing entities do not. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Whether a
patentee is practicing or not, an injunction may suboptimally diminish the social incentives
to commercialize, because the patentee can often gain more leverage in negotiations than
is attributable to the social value of the patent. See Sichelman, supra, at 545–52.  One
might argue that non-practicing entities tend to gain greater “undue” leverage than prac-
ticing entities—for example, because they are repeat players and relatively risk-neutral—
but these fine distinctions played no role in Justice Kennedy’s conclusory assertions. eBay,
547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5 See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 358–62 (2010)
(describing the reward theory of patents).
6 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 130 (2004) (contending that there is no need for patent rights to
encourage ex post activity, in particular, “further investment in the improvement, mainte-
nance, or commercialization of the product”).
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patent law has long shied away from this approach.7  Thus, under current
law, trolls not commercializing their inventions can scarcely justify the views
of those aligned against them.8
Another oft-touted criticism of trolls is that they perform little to no
research and development (R&D) on their patents.9  Yet, this view seems as
odd as the commercialization concern.  Patents have always been tradable,
either through outright sale or licensing,10 and nobody would argue that
only the original inventor should be able to sue for infringement.11
7 See Sichelman, supra note 5, at 343–44 (“The dominant ‘reward’ theory of patent-
ing, which undergirds much of today’s law, perceives little to no need to protect risky and
costly post-invention development and commercialization efforts.”).
8 Some defendants make a more nuanced argument regarding trolls’ lack of commer-
cial activity—namely, that trolls thwart accused infringers’ efforts to defend against
infringement lawsuits by eliminating defendants’ ability to assert infringement counter-
claims so as to spur settlement. See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL32996, PATENT REFORM: INNOVATION ISSUES 9 (2005) (“Because patent
speculators do not otherwise participate in the marketplace, however, they are immune to
such counterclaims.”).  But the only policy reasons in favor of promoting these kinds of
counterclaims would be to lower the social costs of defending against “bad” patents, or
simply costs arising from other systemic defects, neither of which is endemic to “patent
trolls.” See infra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
9 See David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 663
(2010) (“MercExchange was, in popular parlance, a ‘patent troll.’  It did not engage in
research or development, but merely acquired large numbers of patents—such as the one
at issue in eBay—in the hope that one might turn out to be crucial to a big new applica-
tion, so that MercExchange could threaten the creator of that application with an injunc-
tion and extract a juicy settlement.” (footnote omitted)); Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H.
Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
111, 119 (2010) (“One kind of small firm licensor is the so-called ‘patent troll,’ usually
described as an entity that sells no products and performs no R&D, instead earning its
profits through licensing or damages awarded in infringement suits.  On a pessimistic view,
these sorts of licensors are akin to patent slumlords.” (footnote omitted)); Tina M.
Nguyen, Note, Lowering the Fare: Reducing the Patent Troll’s Ability to Tax the Patent System, 22
FED. CIR. B.J. 101, 126 (2012) (“[P]atent trolls typically invest little to no money in research
and development.”).
10 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“Applications for patent, patents, or any interest
therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.”); see also Cutter Labs., Inc.
v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., 179 F.2d 80, 92 (9th Cir. 1949) (“It must be remembered that
the patent laws give the patentee a monopoly.  He may make, use or sell the patented
product, license others, on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis, to do so, authorize the
issuance of sublicenses, or assign the patent itself for a consideration.  The sole limitation
is, that he must not use his legitimate patent monopoly as a means of suppressing competi-
tion or acquiring a monopoly outside of the area of monopoly which the patent grants.”);
Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the Employee-
Inventor, 1830–1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1186 (1998) (“By the late nineteenth cen-
tury . . . the assignability of patents and the enforceability of pre-invention assignment
agreements were well-established aspects of the law and business of patent.”).
11 See Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S.
Ct. 2188, 2195 (2011) (“It is . . . well established that an inventor can assign his rights in an
invention to a third party.”).
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Although trolls themselves might not perform R&D, the inventors listed on
the patents presumably did, so saying that trolls thwart the patent system
because they undertake no R&D is not much different from saying GE
thwarts the patent system, because only its engineers—who assign their pat-
ents to their employer, GE—perform research.12  Rather, from the perspec-
tive of contemporary economics, there is little difference between a vertically
integrated entity like GE and an effective joint venture between independent
inventors and a troll assignee—indeed, the joint ventures are often more effi-
cient means of producing inventions.13
In sum, the two key features of trolls as they are commonly defined—
namely, that they do not commercialize their patents and perform little to no
R&D—are red herrings when it comes to the problems they create for the
patent system, at least on the widely accepted, reward theory of patent law.14
Rather, the major concern over trolls seems to stem from their single-minded
12 Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 99 (2013) (“Individuals
have long assigned their patents to companies that aggregate them.  Usually, such patents
come from employees who assign inventions to their employers . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
13 See HENRY WILLIAM CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CRE-
ATING AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY 1 (2006).  Chesbrough defines “open innovation”
as
the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal
innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively.
[This paradigm] assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as
internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as they look to advance
their technology.
Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innovation,
in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM 1, 1 (Henry Chesbrough, Wim
Vanhaverbeke & Joel West eds., 2006).
14 As noted earlier, if one views the patent system as important to promoting commer-
cialization, then trolls’ failure to make and sell products embodying their patents is cer-
tainly a serious problem. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7.  But only a minority of
scholars and judges hold such a view. See Sichelman, supra note 5, at 358–62, 393 (describ-
ing the widespread “reward” theory of patents, which eschews commercialization of inven-
tion as an appropriate aim for the patent system and offering an alternative
“commercialization” theory); see also Michael Abramowicz & John Duffy, Intellectual Property
for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 408 (2008) (“In general, we believe that
the proposed modification of the patent system to allow for some ‘commercialization’ pat-
ents holds sufficient promise that it should be considered in cases where the hurdles to
commercialization seem particularly daunting.”); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707 (2001) (“Any system focused
on rewarding inventive effort, when an actual good or service is brought to the market,
runs the risk of failing to address the activities that take place after an invention is made
but before it can be profitably exploited.” (emphasis omitted)); Giles S. Rich, The Relation
Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 159, 177 (1942)
(contending that the “aspect of inducement [of the patent laws that] is by far the greatest
in practical importance . . . might be called the inducement to risk an attempt to commer-
cialize the invention”).
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goal of earning revenue from patent litigation and licensing.15  This quest for
patent-induced profits appears to channel many trolls into aggressively
exploiting defects in patent examination, licensing, and litigation in ways
that other patentholders often do not.16  Indeed, on this view, the term
“troll” should be limited only to—and is well deserved for—those non-prac-
ticing entities that abuse the patent system.17  However, to be certain, any
patentholder can—and many do—take advantage of these systemic defects.18
There are at least four serious defects in the patent system.  First,
although the empirical research is limited, it appears the Patent Office issues
many patent claims that are arguably anticipated or obvious in view of prior
technology; overly broad given the scope of the patent disclosure; vague,
ambiguous, and generally difficult to interpret; and introduced and
amended long after the original patent disclosure is filed.19  Despite the
seemingly endless number of “bad” patents, there is a “[p]resumption of
validity” that patents are properly granted,20 which makes invalidating them
in litigation quite costly—usually a million dollars or more.21  Second, paten-
tees and potential infringers face unusually high transaction costs in licens-
15 See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2170 (“Trolls are opportunists that exploit
flaws in the patent system.”); see also Sichelman, supra note 5, at 368 (noting that NPEs
“tend to exploit litigation and licensing market defects to extract unwarranted rents from
commercializers”).
16 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 387, 413 (2014) (“NPEs have rushed in to exploit failings in the patent system by
displacing operating-company plaintiffs because the NPEs can more effectively extract pay-
ments from innovators who are targeted as defendants through no fault of their own.”).
17 Cf. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Infor-
mation?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 799 n.77 (2007) (“[W]e believe that the real solution lies not
around defining a particular abuser of the patent system, but rather in addressing the
system’s flaws that give rise to such abuses.”).
18 See infra Part I (exploring the ways in which manufacturing entities exploit defects
in the patent system); see also Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2139–44 (describing how
infringement suits by trolls can often be more costly than those filed by practicing entities).
19 See Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1017, 1018 (2004) (“[D]efects in the patent system are raising costs, imposing
uncertainty, and restricting product design choices.”); Sichelman, supra note 5, at 344,
356–57, 383–84 (noting that there are “[r]ampant defects in patent examination, licens-
ing, and litigation”).
20 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); see also Microsoft
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2250–51 (2011) (reaffirming that § 282 not only
presumes the validity of every claim of issued patents, but also requires that overcoming
that presumption requires clear and convincing evidence).
21 See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation over Second-Window
Review and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick?, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1937, 1950–51 (2009) (“Under the present system, the high costs of junk
patents are directly tied to the legal presumption of validity that is applied to all issued
patents, under which the litigant challenging validity bears the burden of proving invalidity
under a higher standard of proof than that which usually applies in civil cases.”); see also Jay
P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the
Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 242–43 (2006) (recog-
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ing negotiations and litigation, which is fueled in large part by uncertainty
and instability in many patent law doctrines.22  The distorting effects of these
costs are especially problematic in technological fields for which patent
search and analysis are difficult.23  Third, patentholders can delay assertions
of infringement until a relevant market is well developed and the costs of
switching to a non-infringing technology are exorbitant.24  Fourth, asymmet-
ric resources, stakes, and levels of risk-aversion between repeat players, such
as trolls and large patentholders versus one-time players, such as startup com-
panies, can result in highly skewed litigation outcomes, especially when sub-
stantial damages are at stake.25
Although trolls appear to be especially adept at exploiting these defects,
they are not the only group doing so.  Another important class of
patentholders—namely, large practicing entities that often hold many pat-
ents—appear to be exploiting the same sorts of defects, and potentially, at
much greater rates.26  Just like the trolls, these “patent bullies” take full
advantage of weak, uncertain, and vague patents; the high costs of litigation;
the ability to delay lawsuits; and their massive resources in order to engage in
highly anticompetitive behavior, often against market entrants and star-
tups.27  Specifically, patent bullies assert their patents against entrants to pre-
nizing the difficulties of revoking invalid patents in the face of extremely high litigation
costs, running from $500,000 to $3 million per suit).
22 See Michael A. Lavine, Ripples in the Patent Pool: The Impact and Implications of the
Evolving Essentiality Analysis, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 605, 608–09 (2008) (“[A]bsent a patent
pooling situation, third parties wishing to use a given patented technology would need to
obtain licenses at least from each holder of the blocking patents.  This situation could
subsequently cause a plethora of problems such as high transaction costs of obtaining
licenses, high litigation expenses and hold outs.”).
23 Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 289, 316 (2012) (“The combination of very high transaction costs (e.g., the costs of
locating a patent holder to negotiate a license with) and punitive legal penalties (e.g., an
injunction or multiplied damages for infringement) can prevent beneficial uses of prop-
erty and waste resources by making property use very costly.”).
24 See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 541–54 (describing holdup problems not only in the
context of NPEs but also for “practicing entities asserting patents on components of com-
plex products [when] switching costs are high”).
25 See Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 857
(2002) (“[N]ot all plaintiffs are likely to be repeat players in patent litigation and therefore
there may be an information asymmetry.”); cf. Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why
Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1086 (2008) (“The rational would-be
infringer, when confronted with a patent held by an individual inventor or a small com-
pany with limited resources, would likely be more willing to engage in infringing behavior,
calculating that the risk of enforcement is lower.”).
26 See infra Part I (describing the exploiting activities of several large practicing entities
in filing suit against Vonage in a series of patent infringement suits).
27 See infra Part I.  In 2008, I defined the term “patent bully” as referring to the abusive
practices of large practicing patentholders, typically against smaller entities. See Graham &
Sichelman, supra note 25, at 1080 (describing “patent bullying”).  Since then, “patent
bully” has been used in this manner numerous times. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 1, at 1588;
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2167; Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the
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vent innovative, disruptive technologies from competing with the bullies’
outmoded products.28  Additionally, bullies desiring to enter a new market
wield their patents against startups that are already well positioned in the
market.29  In particular, a patent bully can file an infringement suit to com-
pel a license from a startup to its innovative technology—which, in turn, the
bully uses to trounce the startup by leveraging pre-established production
capacity, marketing channels, and general goodwill, as well as by engaging in
effective predatory pricing by tying the innovative product to the sale of pre-
existing products.30  These effects are often compounded by keiretsu-style,
cross-licensing agreements among industry incumbents, which provide a veri-
table zone of freedom to the incumbents, but a wall of impenetrability to
entrants.31
The remainder of this Article provides an in-depth description and anal-
ysis of the patent bullying problem by undertaking a case study of a trilogy of
suits filed by incumbent telecommunications carriers against Vonage Hold-
Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637, 655 (2013); Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusiv-
ity Make Biologic Patents Passe´?, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 273
(2013).  The term is related to “trademark bully,” which is typically used to refer to “a large
company that seeks to put an end to behavior by individuals and small businesses that it
perceives as a danger to its own intellectual property even though its legal claims against
these other parties are spurious or non-existent.”  Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trade-
mark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 854 (2012); see Leah Chan
Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625 (using the term in the scholarly
literature for the first time, although it had been used in the commercial sphere several
years earlier).
28 See Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1316 (2009) (“If the litigation is launched by a ‘bully’ attempting
to put the startup out of business, the suit may indeed yield such a result if the startup is
unable or unwilling to tap the capital markets to fund lengthy and expensive litigation.”);
see also infra Part I (describing the attempts of incumbent telecommunications carriers to
displace Vonage from the market).
29 See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 25, at 1077 (“Thus, if a patentee spots a start-
up using its patented technology and desires a license to the start-up’s patents—except in
the very unlikely event that the start-up has a significant portfolio to cross-license—the
start-up would presumably provide a payment (either up-front, as an on-going royalty, or
both) to the patentee as part of the cross-licensing agreement.”).
30 See id. at 1087–88 (“Alternatively, a company may have ‘first-mover’ advantages or
hold complementary assets that effectively prevent competition in the market for commer-
cial embodiments of the invention.”); see also David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological
Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y
285 (1986) (discussing the benefits of first-mover advantages and complementary assets).
31 See F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional
Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 413 (2006)
(“[F]ollowing the FTC recommendations may lead to a system under which large players
could regularly trade large numbers of weak patents with each other while at the same time
frustrating market entry.”); F. Scott Kieff, A Keiretsu Approach to Patents, INTELL. ASSET
MGMT. 52 (Feb./Mar. 2007), http://hoohila.stanford.edu/Commercializing%20Innova
tion/Files/OP-A%20Keiretsu%20Approach%20to%20Patents.pdf (discussing the mecha-
nism behind the “keiretsu” effect of cross-licensing networks).
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ings Company (Vonage), an early-stage company that provides consumer
telephone services over the Internet.32  By evaluating the decisions of
Vonage’s and Sprint’s counsel in the context of the patents-in-suit, accused
technology, prior art, and hired experts, this Article offers an atypical, “law in
action” approach33 for assessing the defects of the present patent system.34
Such a mode of inquiry is radically different from not only the doctrinally
oriented analyses that generally ignore the effects of counsel on case out-
comes and judicial opinions, but also the high-level empirical analyses that
tend to abstract away from the day-to-day decisions of parties, lawyers, and
judges.35
More concretely, this Article examines how Sprint, Verizon, and AT&T
filed suits to prevent Vonage from continuing to gain market share from the
carriers with its disruptive, Internet-based, consumer telephony services.36
Although it appears that all or nearly all of the patents-in-suit were very likely
not infringed, invalid, or unenforceable, Vonage had comparatively limited
resources and lacked the experience to vigorously and skillfully defend
32 See infra Section I.A (describing Vonage’s history and services).
33 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910) (“But if
we look closely, distinctions between law in the books and law in action, between the rules
that purport to govern the relations of man and man and those that in fact govern them,
will appear, and it will be found that today also the distinction between legal theory and
judicial administration is often a very real and a very deep one.”); see also MORTON J. HOR-
WITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 169–89 (1992) (discussing
the rise of legal realism and sociological jurisprudence and the potential of “law in action”
to reform “law in the books”); G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999,
1004–13 (1972) (describing the influence of Roscoe Pound on the development of socio-
logical jurisprudence and legal realism, which placed emphasis on the role of law in prac-
tice, rather than legal doctrine).
34 I only provide a brief account of the AT&T suit, because I represented Vonage in
that case. See infra note 53.  Additionally, because of space considerations and the lack of
electronic access to most of the documents in the Verizon case, I analyze that suit in lesser
detail. See infra Part I.
35 See Pamela S. Karlan, Answering Questions, Questioning Answers, and the Roles of Empiri-
cism in the Law of Democracy, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (2013) (“It would be a pity if legal
scholarship, like much of contemporary political science, were to adopt the view that the
only questions worth asking, and the only answers worth giving, are quantitative or based
on models so highly stylized that they omit the messy but important lessons of
experience.”).
36 See infra Part I (describing the anticompetitive goals of the incumbents’ suits against
Vonage).  In an article focusing on the threats to Voice over IP (VoIP) providers from a
telecommunications law perspective, John Blevins has also recounted the Vonage trilogy of
suits filed by the incumbent carriers.  John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on
Competitive Broadband Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 117–21, 131–32 (2009) (quoting
Graham & Sichelman, supra note 25, at 1080).  However, unlike the treatment here, Blev-
ins’s account occupies a little over five journal pages and primarily relies on news reports,
rather than the underlying court documents, patents, and prior art. See id.
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against these suits.37  As a result, it paid more than $200 million in settlement
payments to the carriers.38  Ultimately, Vonage’s seemingly unwarranted set-
tlement payments placed it at the brink of insolvency—drastically reducing
its stock price and severely weakening its position in the market.39  Perhaps
more importantly, the outcome of the Vonage trilogy—which was widely pub-
licized in the mainstream media—has provided a strong signal to incumbents
that patent litigation, even when the underlying case is weak, can be an effec-
tive tool to quash competition.40
Despite the serious nature of patent bullying, scant attention has been
paid to it in the popular press and academic literature, especially in recent
years.41  Arguably, the paucity of discussion of patent bullying stems in large
part from certain practicing entities effectively diverting attention away from
their own exploitative behavior by placing the blame on so-called “non-prac-
ticing entities” (NPEs) and “patent assertion entities” (PAEs), often taken to
be synonymous with “patent trolls.”42  Although I do not contend that abu-
37 See Blevins, supra note 36, at 117–21, 131–32 (explaining how industry observers
generally viewed the incumbents’ suits as weak).  One might ask how Vonage was able to
pay the $200 million in settlement amounts if “it had comparatively limited
resources to . . . vigorously defend against these suits.”  As I explain below, Vonage was
sued during a period of rapid revenue growth of roughly 300% annually. See infra Section
I.A.  Specifically, at the time of the first suit, Vonage’s annual revenue was likely around
$200 million per year, but by the time of the first settlement, it had grown to about $800
million per year. See infra note 73 and accompanying text; see also Press Release, Vonage
Holdings Corp., Vonage Holdings Corp. Reports Third Quarter 2007 Results (Nov. 8,
2007), available at http://ir.vonage.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=274778.  Nonethe-
less, Vonage nearly went bankrupt because of the settlement payments. See infra notes
200–02 and accompanying text.
38 See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 200–05 and accompanying text.
40 See infra Conclusion (explaining how relatively weak suits filed by patent bullies can
cause substantial economic harm by diminishing competition); see also Blevins, supra note
36, at 118 (“In addition to the sheer amount of damages Vonage had to pay, the litigation
sent a significant and cautionary signal to the market.  Like all new startups, independent
VoIP companies relied on attracting investors.  The litigation, however, substantially
increased the risks of investing in any independent VoIP company.”); id. at 119 (noting
that, while Vonage had problems apart from the patent litigation, “the patent litigation
threat posed [the most] serious and even existential threat” as evidenced by the fact that
“Vonage’s most serious signs of weakness tended to correlate closely in time with Vonage’s
fortunes in the patent litigation”).
41 Notable exceptions to this trend include Chien, supra note 1; Graham & Sichelman,
supra note 25; Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary
Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 575 (2001); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and
Anticompetitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509 (2003); Gwendolyn G. Ball
& Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: Strategic Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small
Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Papers Series,
Paper No. 08-21, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstrat=1337166.  However, none of
these works conducts an in-depth case study of patent bullying.
42 See Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing
Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 136 (2010) (“Opponents of NPEs have also been actively
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sive behavior by trolls should be condoned, it should be viewed in the light of
rampant abusive behavior by non-practicing and practicing entities alike.43
The Vonage case study presented herein indicates that as “patent bullies,”
practicing entities can engage in similar levels of abuse as the non-practicing
trolls.44
I. THE GENESIS, SUCCESS, AND BULLYING OF VONAGE
This Part begins by recounting the genesis of Vonage in 2000 and its
rapid growth over the next five years.  Next, it describes the suits filed against
Vonage by Sprint, Verizon, and AT&T, including an in-depth analysis of the
patents and technologies at issue in the Sprint case.  In so doing, I conclude
that Vonage failed to raise (or waived) potentially determinative defenses in
the Sprint case, which it settled for roughly $80 million.45  In analyzing the
Sprint case in detail, I do not mean to convey that Sprint’s tactics during
litigation per se were “bullying”—rather, my aim is to show that although
Sprint’s claims were weak at best, it was nonetheless able to force Vonage to
pay $80 million.46  The ability of large patentees to extract sizable payments
from smaller companies on patents of highly dubious merit is exemplative of
the systemic abuse present in today’s patent system.47
Last, I examine several suits filed against Vonage by ostensible “trolls,” as
well as a suit Vonage “acquired” that was directed against the incumbent car-
riers.48  In general, I conclude that the patent system was not effective for
Vonage as a plaintiff—and, more importantly—afforded ample opportunity
for patent bullying of Vonage by industry incumbents, with results far worse
than those inflicted on Vonage by the trolls.49
As a preliminary matter, the reader might wonder whether a legal aca-
demic is suitably positioned to play “Monday morning quarterback” in evalu-
ating the decisions of lawyers in cases involving highly complex technologies
and spanning several years and hundreds of pleadings.50  Normally, the
answer to this question would be an indubitable “no.”  However, in this situa-
tion, I believe the answer is a qualified “yes.”  Specifically, before practicing as
a patent litigator, I founded and ran a software communications company
that sold Voice over IP (VoIP) systems that included technology similar to
lobbying Congress to curb their ability to threaten product manufacturers.”); supra note 1
(citing sources discussing PAEs).
43 See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 541–54 (describing how practicing entities can cause
holdup problems in essentially the same manner as NPEs).
44 See infra Part I.
45 See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
46 See infra subsection I.B.1.
47 See supra notes 19–31 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 206–11 and accompanying text.
49 See infra Conclusion.
50 See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1457 (Philip Babcock Gove
ed., 1993) (defining a “Monday morning quarterback” as “a person who using hindsight
criticizes what others have done”).
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that used by Vonage.51  In this regard, I was heavily involved in the design,
development, and installation of my company’s VoIP-related products.52
Additionally, I represented Vonage in its action against AT&T—albeit
briefly, as the case settled shortly after filing—and also represented Skype,
the largest provider of VoIP services in the world, in two unrelated patent
infringement actions.  As part of my professional and legal work, I have
become quite familiar with the types of VoIP technologies employed by
Vonage, including prior art relevant to the patents-in-suit in the Vonage tril-
ogy.  Although I have not read every pleading in detail in the Sprint case—
nor do I even have access to all of them, as many were filed under seal—in
drafting this Article, I spent numerous hours reading the patents-in-suit,
pleadings, and orders, as well as searching for and reviewing potential prior
art.  Although I can legitimately convince only those intimately familiar with
the facts of the case of the correctness of my conclusions, hopefully the analy-
sis presented herein will inform any reader of the weakness of Sprint’s suit
and the critical omissions Vonage made in defense.53
A. Traditional Telephony and the Birth of Vonage
Up until the mid-1990s, voice-based telephone communications com-
prised a combination of traditional “circuit switched” (effectively analog) net-
works—often known collectively as the “public switched telephone network”
(PSTN)—and private “packet-based” (effectively digital) networks, which
were typically used to carry long-distance traffic between local “relay” points
connected to the PSTN.54  With the rise of the Internet, a number of compa-
51 The company is Unified Dispatch LLC. See UNIFIED DISPATCH, http://www.unified-
dispatch.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); Executive Profile: Ted Sichelman, BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?person
Id=2719138&privcapId=2703941&previousCapId=2703941&previousTitle=Unified%20Dis
patch%20LLC (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
52 See Automated Transp. Call-Taking System, U.S. Patent No. 2003/0235282 A1, at
[0004] (filed Feb. 11, 2003) (“The present invention relates generally to an automated
system for inputting, accessing, and retrieving speech- and touch-tone (DTMF) based
information for processes related to passenger ground transportation through an ordinary
or Voice over IP (VOIP) telephone using specialized voice recognition software and hard-
ware.”); Can. Patent No. 2,475,869 (filed Feb. 11, 2003) (issued Feb. 1, 2011) (stating the
same).
53 As I mentioned earlier, this Article only briefly examines the Verizon and AT&T
cases because of space limitations, the lack of readily available court documents, and my
representation of Vonage in the AT&T case. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
54 Mayor of Balt. v. Vonage Am. Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 458, 462 n.7 (D. Md. 2008)
(“The PSTN is an international system of public circuit-switched telephone networks based
on copper wires that carries analog voice data.”); Sprint Spectrum LP v. Comm’r of Reve-
nue, Nos. 7299-R, 7308-R & 7309-R, 2003 WL 21246600, at *3 (Minn. Tax Ct. May 23, 2003)
(“Sprint Communications employs various items of equipment which were purchased dur-
ing the tax periods at issue, which have been incorporated into its long distance network.
The network is housed at switch complexes and consists of tandem switches, long distance
switches, core switches, digital multiplex system switches, international gateway switches,
cable, wire, multiplexers, repeaters/regenerators, digital cross connection systems, fiber
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-DEC-14 16:13
2014] the  vonage  trilogy 555
nies endeavored to carry voice traffic over that, effectively public, packet-
based network.55  Early providers, such as the Israeli company, VocalTec,
required that all users be on the Internet to place and receive calls.56  Yet, in
early 1996, VocalTec demonstrated an innovative Internet Protocol (IP)-
PSTN gateway that bridged the PSTN and IP worlds.57  This sort of gateway
allowed callers on a standard telephone network to call someone on the
Internet and vice versa.58  Soon after VocalTec released its gateway, other
manufacturers, such as Cisco Systems, Inc. (Cisco), offered similar gate-
ways.59  With a large variety of cost-affordable and reliable gateways available,
a number of Internet telephony companies were founded to offer consumers
standard telephone services that used the Internet to substantially reduce the
costs of carrying long-distance calls.60
The fastest growing of these companies in the early 2000s was Vonage
Holdings Company.61  Founded in 2000, by 2005, Vonage had over 1.2 mil-
optic terminals, hardware jack fields, signaling system equipment and frame relay equip-
ment, and internet protocol equipment.”).
55 See Adam Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 369, 424
(2004) (“Only recently have companies like Vonage started to offer IP telephony long
distance calls.  They use the Internet to bypass the long-distance telephone networks—and
thus avoid access charges.”).
56 Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. v. VocalTec Commc’n, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1047 (D.
Minn. 2000) (“[VocalTec companies] make, use, offer for sale, and sell products and ser-
vices that allow users to engage in telephone calls over communication lines using Internet
Protocol.”); Eryn Brown, VocalTec Software for Internet Phone Calls, FORTUNE MAG. (July 8,
1996), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1996/07/08/21
4359/index.htm (describing VocalTec’s “Internet Phone”).
57 VocalTec Introduces the Internet Phone Telephony Gateway Linking Traditional and Internet
Telephone Networks, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 8, 1996), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/VOCAL
TEC+INTRODUCES+THE+INTERNET+PHONE+TELEPHONY+GATEWAY+LINKING. . .-
a018069250.
58 See id. (describing “a system that will enable real-time voice conversations for normal
telephone users through the Internet to another local, long-distance or international tele-
phone user”).
59 See Cisco Announces New Voice Packet Gateway Solution; Offers High-Quality, Reliable Voice;
Communication Costs Reduced by Up to 50 Percent, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 21, 1997), http://www.the
freelibrary.com/Cisco+Announces+New+Voice+Packet+Gateway+Solution%3B+Offers. . .-
a019912580.
60 See OLIVIER HERSENT, IP TELEPHONY: DEPLOYING VOIP PROTOCOLS AND IMS INFRA-
STRUCTURE, at xxix (2d ed. 2010) (“Since 1998 Voice over IP, in short VoIP, has been the
favorite buzzword of the telecom industry.”); Joe Hallock, A Brief History of VoIP: Docu-
ment One – The Past 7 (Nov. 26, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www
.joehallock.com/edu/pdfs/Hallock_J_VoIP_Past.pdf (documenting the rise of the VoIP
industry and noting that “[b]y 1998 some entrepreneurs started to market PC-to-phone
and phone-to-phone VoIP solutions”).
61 See Profile: Vonage Holdings Corporation, YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr
?s=VG (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); Timeline, http://www.vonage.com/corporate/images/
vonage_timeline.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
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lion subscribers, a number that was growing at over 300% per year.62  The
driver behind Vonage’s phenomenal growth and revenue was its ability to
offer “unlimited” local and long-distance calling on any ordinary telephone
for about $40 per month.63  Although Vonage’s calls are carried over the
Internet, a user simply plugs an adapter into an ordinary phone and con-
nects it to a router—and with some minimal installation—starts placing calls
in a manner essentially indistinguishable from a traditional phone service.64
Thus, Vonage was not simply an add-on, but an entire replacement, for the
services offered by the incumbent carriers.65  Not only were carriers losing
many subscribers and substantial revenue to Vonage in the mid-2000s, they
were implicitly funding Vonage’s low-cost service because they built and
maintained most of the underlying network for the Internet in the United
States.66  Although the carriers were paid by their subscribers for their use of
the Internet, because landline data plans in the United States typically pro-
vided (and still provide) for unlimited data transmission and downloads, the
carriers were effectively subsidizing Vonage’s discounts.67  Moreover, by pro-
viding its services over the “preexisting” Internet, Vonage was able to avoid
being classified as a traditional telephone service, which allowed it to escape
burdensome regulation and taxes.68  As such, the incumbent carriers were
presumably highly motivated to find any way to prevent Vonage from
expanding its subscriber base.
B. The Vonage Trilogy
1. Sprint v. Vonage
In October 2005, Sprint filed an infringement suit on seven patents
against Vonage in the District of Kansas.69  In terms of relative resources—
62 See supra Timeline, note 61; THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Survey: VoIP Triples in 2005, RED-
MOND MAGAZINE (Mar. 1, 2006), http://redmondmag.com/articles/2006/03/01/survey-
voip-triples-in-2005.aspx.
63 See Ted Hearn, An Advantage for Vonage? VoIP Rival Rides Cable Pipe, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS (Jan. 6, 2003), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-96379036.html.
64 See Lev Grossman, On the Internet, Talk Is Cheap, TIME, Apr. 15, 2002, at 77.
65 See Christopher Williams, Vonage: Patent Smackdown Won’t Bring Shutters Down, THE
REGISTER (Feb. 26, 2007, 11:57 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2007/02/26/
vonage_defends_against_verizon/.
66 In re Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 FCC Rcd. 22,404, 22,406 (2004) (“Because Vonage
does not offer Internet access services . . . customers must obtain a broadband connection
to the Internet from another provider.”).
67 See Beth Simone Noveck, The State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) (noting
the “[t]he boost in available bandwidth for home users and the increasing penetration of
Internet connectivity (helped by a move to flat-rate pricing)”).
68 See Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999,
1001–02 (D. Minn. 2003) (finding that Vonage did not provide “telecommunications ser-
vices”), aff’’d, 394 F.3d 568, 568 (8th Cir. 2004).
69 Complaint, Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290
(D. Kan. 2007) (No. 05-2433-JWL), 2005 WL 3776507.
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and using the end of 2005 as a benchmark—Sprint had 430 U.S. patents,70
$35 billion in revenue, $1.8 billion in net profits, 60,000 employees, and 48
million customers,71 while Vonage had no issued patents,72 $269 million in
revenue, $262 million in net losses, 1355 employees, and 1.27 million cus-
tomers.73  Notably, Vonage’s lack of a patent portfolio (by definition) pre-
cluded it from the preferred tactic of “defending” against suit by asserting its
patents back against Sprint.74  Indeed, as recounted in more detail below,
Vonage settled the case after purchasing a set of patents that Sprint was
accused of infringing in another case.75
The seven patents-in-suit all disclosed technological systems and meth-
ods to route voice traffic on a traditional telephone network—i.e., the “pub-
lic switched telephone network” (PSTN)—to and from a digital, packet-based
network that uses an “asynchronous transfer mode” (ATM), non-Internet
protocol.76  Like so-called “patent trolls,” Sprint admitted in its interrogato-
ries that it never practiced the patents, though there was some evidence that
Cisco Systems, Inc. was a licensee of the patents-in-suit, and that Cisco sold
products that could be used in practicing the patents.77  In this regard, one
critical fact in the case was that Vonage purchased most of its communica-
70 See USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/
PTO/search-adv.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (showing 430 issued U.S. patents assigned
to “Sprint” as of Dec. 31, 2005).
71 See Investor Quarterly Update: Fourth Quarter and Year-End 2005 Results, SPRINT (Feb. 21,
2006), http://newsroom.sprint.com/news-releases/investor-quarterly-update-fourth-quar-
ter-and-year-end-2005-results.htm; The Infotech 100 Companies: Sprint Nextel, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (2006), http://www.businessweek.com/it100/2006/36.htm (reporting 2005
company information).
72 See USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/
PTO/search-adv.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (showing no issued U.S. patents assigned
to “Vonage” as of December 31, 2005).
73 See Vonage Holdings Corp., Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1 (Form S-1/A), (Apr. 7,
2006), available at http://ir.vonage.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1047469-06-4820.
74 Risch, supra note 12, at 100 (“[IBM] is rarely, if ever, sued for patent infringement
by its competitors.  The reason is simple: any company that might sue IBM for infringing a
patent would face counterclaims for infringing several IBM patents.  The result is either no
action or a cross-license agreement between IBM and the other party.” (citations
omitted)).
75 See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
76 See Complaint, supra note 69, at 2–4 (listing asserted patents, including U.S. Patent
Nos. 6,304,572 (filed May 20, 1998), 6,633,561 (filed Nov. 14, 2001), 6,463,052 (filed May
20, 1998), 6,473,429 (filed July 15, 1999), 6,452,932 (filed Feb. 7, 2000), 6,298,064 (filed
Feb. 15, 2000), and 6,665,294 (filed Aug. 5, 2002)).
77 See Memorandum in Support of Vonage Holdings Corp. & Vonage Am., Inc.’s
Motion Seeking Leave to Amend Their Respective Answers, Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaims Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 15 at 4–5, Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Vonage Hold-
ings Corp., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Kan. 2007) (No. 05-2433-JWL) [hereinafter Memo-
randum in Support].
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tions equipment from Cisco, which led to potential defenses I explore
below.78
Because the specifications of the patents-in-suit disclosed carrying voice
traffic over an ATM-based network, as opposed to the Internet, claim con-
struction revolved around whether Sprint’s patents could cover an IP net-
work.79  In this regard—like savvy trolls—Sprint filed an original patent
application, which it abandoned, then filed a series of “continuation” applica-
tions, including those that resulted in the seven patents-in-suit.80  By using
continuations, Sprint was able to rely on the filing date of its original applica-
tion for new claims that purported to cover non-ATM networks.81  Indeed,
Sprint’s earliest-issued patent claims are limited to ATM networks,82 while its
later patents removed this limitation, presumably in an attempt to reach IP
networks like those used by Vonage.83  Importantly, because Sprint’s later
patent applications were entitled to rely on the 1994 filing date of the origi-
nal application, all of the developments in the field of Internet telephony
between then and the late 1990s (the actual filing date of the patents-in-suit)
78 See Memorandum in Support of Vonage Holdings Corp. & Vonage Am., Inc.’s
Objections to and Motion for Review of Orders of May 14, 2007 and May 16, 2007 Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 at 2, Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (No. 05-2433-JWL), 2007 WL
5189610.  Vonage sought to amend its answer to include the affirmative defenses of
“license, express or implied, or other contract” based on facts and documents relating to
agreements between Sprint and Cisco initially withheld by Sprint and produced only at the
close of discovery, and only in part. See Memorandum in Support, supra note 77, at 3.  In
the parties’ proposed pretrial order, Vonage also unsuccessfully asserted these materials as
support for those defenses it had alleged in its original pleading, including its affirmative
defense of estoppel. See Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.
79 See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1313 (D.
Kan. 2007).
80 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (noting that all of the asserted patents were continu-
ations of previously filed applications).
81 See id. (“Vonage disputes Sprint’s allegations that its [non-ATM] VoIP system
infringes any claims of the asserted patents, either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2012) (allowing continuations to rely upon the
filing date of the original patent application); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, End-
ing Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 68 (2004) (“The continuation applica-
tion is treated just like a new application, giving the applicant another set of chances to
persuade the examiner to allow the claims, to further amend the claims, or even to hope to
get a different examiner.” (citations omitted)).
82 See Vonage’s Memorandum in Opposition to Sprint’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 7, ¶ 15, Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (No. 05-2433-JWL), 2007 WL 2813950
[hereinafter Vonage’s Memorandum in Opposition] (“In the parent application of the
patents-in-suit that was filed while Mr. Christie [the inventor] was still alive and whose
claims Mr. Christie reviewed, each of the independent claims contained limitations
directed to elements described in Mr. Christie’s initial disclosure documents, such as an
‘ATM interworking multiplexer.’”).
83 See id. at 8, ¶ 16 (“Following Mr. Christie’s death, Sprint removed these limitations
from its claims.”).
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were excluded from the set of potential prior art that could be used to invali-
date the patents.84
Although Vonage was able to win a key claim construction battle that
limited the literal scope of many of the asserted claims to ATM networks, as I
recount below, it apparently failed to mount arguments that would have
probably given it a winning defense of non-infringement for three of the
seven patents under the doctrine of equivalents.85  In addition to Vonage’s
failure to limit the patents to ATM networks—despite the seemingly wide
array of prior art available to it and strong evidence showing the inventor of
the patents never considered his invention to apply to IP networks86—it did
not move for many defenses of invalidity on summary judgment, including
anticipation and obviousness,87 and was unsuccessful in showing invalidity at
trial.88  Finally, Vonage waived the potentially decisive defenses of “implied
license” and “exhaustion” by waiting to assert them until the last day of dis-
covery.89  Taken together, these omissions arguably turned Sprint’s seem-
ingly “weak” case into an effectively “strong” one.
Part of Vonage’s failure to mount these defenses presumably stemmed
from the inexperience of its experts, who—as I explain below—appeared rel-
atively unfamiliar with the technology-at-issue.90  Of course, ultimately it is
counsel who is responsible for selecting experts, gathering evidence, and
mounting a case.  Yet, according to the court and all other indicators,
Vonage’s counsel was quite experienced in patent litigation matters.91  Thus,
one might surmise that Vonage’s omissions and waivers—some of them quite
serious—resulted more from a lack of time and resources, rather than skill,
84 See id. at 12, ¶ 48 (“Sprint was amending its claims at the same time market analysis
predicted industry developments making internet telephony a real challenge.”); see also
Lemley & Moore, supra note 81, at 66–68 (explaining how continuation applications are
entitled to the benefit of the original filing date, thereby excluding prior art between the
date the original application is filed and the date the continuation is filed).
85 See infra notes 131–34 and accompanying text.
86 See Vonage’s Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 82, at 6, ¶ 8; id. (citing a
PowerPoint slide of the inventor stating the invention’s purpose was to “describe a new
switched ATM/circuit network architecture”).
87 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1331–45 (deciding Vonage’s various motions for
invalidity).
88 Verdict, Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (No. 05-2433-JWL), 2007 WL 2790718 (report-
ing the jury’s findings that none of the asserted patent claims were invalid).
89 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1347 (“Vonage contended that the belated amendment
was justified because Vonage had only recently come into possession of a contract between
Sprint and Cisco, the terms of which include licenses, covenants not to sue, and other
terms that Vonage contended may bar Sprint’s claims against Vonage.  The magistrate
judge denied Vonage’s motion on the grounds of undue delay and prejudice to Sprint.  He
noted that Vonage’s motion was filed on the last day of discovery in the case over two
months after Sprint produced the purportedly ‘newly discovered’ documents, and implic-
itly rejected Vonage’s justification that it had been busy pursuing follow-up discovery.”).
90 See infra notes 93–101 and accompanying text.
91 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1304 (“Vonage is represented by sophisticated counsel
and competent local counsel . . . .”).
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arguably brought on by a constrained litigation budget.92  With these caveats,
I now turn to the details of the case.
a. Battle of the Experts (or Not)
Perhaps the first—and, surely, one of the most important—strategic gaf-
fes by Vonage’s counsel was hiring a non-infringement expert who was argua-
bly unqualified and an invalidity expert with very little relevant knowledge in
the field.  Specifically, for its non-infringement expert, Vonage hired Joel M.
Halpern, a consultant in the field of networking.93  Although Halpern had
extensive experience in the area of ATM and IP networks,94 as Sprint recog-
nized in a motion to exclude his expert opinions, his expertise encompassed
data networking but not traditional telephony, including the PSTN.95
Because the patents and technology at issue all involved transferring calls
between the PSTN and packet networks (such as ATM and IP networks),
Vonage’s non-infringement expert only had knowledge of half of the equa-
tion.96  Although Sprint’s motion to exclude Halpern was not granted,97
Vonage arguably suffered from his lack of expertise.  As discussed below, it
appears Vonage failed to introduce important non-infringement arguments
at summary judgment and presented a poor case of non-infringement at
trial.98
Vonage’s invalidity expert, Frank R. Koperda, had some experience in
interfacing traditional telephony platforms with digital networks, but it was in
the mid-1980s, more than ten years before the critical date of the patents-in-
92 See Graham, Merges, Samuelson & Sichelman, supra note 28, at 1315 (“Another
downside of patents in a startup’s competitive environment is the threat of patent disputes
and, when negotiation fails, costly litigation.  Startups may be particularly sensitive to accu-
sations of infringement because they are likely to experience resource constraints when
faced with the costs of funding a suit, estimated for most suits to be between $3 million and
$6 million per litigant through appeal.”); Malani & Masur, supra note 27, at 654 (noting
that a startup’s “capital constraints can make a battle with a larger firm very difficult for a
startup to win”).
93 Megisto Systems Appoints Joel Halpern CTO, TELECOMPAPER (Jan. 15, 2003, 3:02 PM),
http://www.telecompaper.com/news/megisto-systems-appoints-joel-halpern-cto—350936
(noting Halpern’s “more than 24 years of experience in architecting IP networks and ser-
vice infrastructure”).
94 See id. (making reference to Halpern’s experience in both of these areas).
95 Sprint’s Brief in Support of Its Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Vonage’s Expert
Joel M. Halpern at 5, Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (No. 05-2433-JWL), 2007 WL 2821679
[hereinafter Sprint’s Brief in Support of its Motion to Exclude] (“[W]hile Mr. Halpern has
worked on wireless and cellular networks, this work involved data networking, not voice
telephony or the Public Switched Telephone Network (‘PSTN’).”).
96 See id. (“Mr. Halpern does not have experience with narrowband signaling require-
ments or with the transmission of voice over the PSTN.”).
97 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1331 (“[T]he court will also deny Sprint’s motion to
exclude Mr. Halpern’s non-infringement opinions.”).
98 See infra notes 129–44, 168 and accompanying text.
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suit.99  The rest of Koperda’s experience—like Halpern’s—was mainly in
data networking, and his small amount of experience in VoIP did not involve
connections between the PSTN and IP networks.100  Like Halpern,
Koperda’s inexperience in PSTN-IP internetworking apparently led to
Vonage’s failure to lodge strong invalidity defenses.101
b. Missed Prior Art and Key Defenses
Vonage was unable to mount a substantial defense of anticipation or
obviousness.102  Although I have not exhaustively searched for or analyzed
the prior art relevant to the patents-in-suit, industry observers indicated that
Sprint’s patents were likely invalid, and the failure of Vonage to lodge sub-
stantial prior art likely seems to be a significant oversight.103  Despite the
ostensive gaps in Vonage’s prior art disclosures, because Sprint’s patents only
disclosed communications technologies in an ATM environment, but the
claims in the patents in issue were drafted to cover any type of network—
including an IP environment—it should at least have been apparent to
Vonage’s counsel that lack of written description would be a critical
defense.104  In this regard, recall that the enablement requirement demands
that the specification “describe how to make and use the invention,” while
the written description requirement mandates that the specification “show
that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”105
Although Vonage’s counsel apparently recognized the importance of a
non-enablement defense—and while Vonage’s expert’s invalidity report is
sealed—other documents show that Vonage’s counsel apparently overlooked
the lack of written description as a separate defense at summary judgment.106
99 See Employment History for Frank R. Koperda, NEXTGENDC.COM, http://www.nextgendc
.com/resume_employment.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
100 See id.
101 See infra notes 103–13 and accompanying text.
102 See supra text accompanying notes 87–88 (noting that Vonage did not mount antici-
pation or obviousness defenses at summary judgment and that the jury ultimately found
the patents-in-suit valid).
103 See, e.g., Mike Masnick, AT&T Joins the Party of Jealous Telcos: Sues Vonage for Patent
Infringement, TECHDIRT (Oct. 22, 2007, 1:03 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/2007
1019/184443.shtml (“[I]t’s just ridiculous piling on against the first company that actually
figured out how to market a VoIP telephone replacement service by a bunch of telcos who
refused to innovate.”).
104 See supra text accompanying notes 79–84.
105 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345, 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (distinguishing between the enablement and written description requirements); see
also In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that for written description,
the critical question is whether the description “clearly allow[s] persons of ordinary skill in
the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed” (citing In re Wertheim, 541
F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976))).
106 Although the court remarked that “Vonage contends that the asserted patents are
invalid pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 for failure to comply with the written description,
enablement, and definiteness requirements,” the court only addressed indefiniteness in its
summary judgment order, indicating that Vonage did not raise a separate written descrip-
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In particular, in a response brief to Sprint’s motion to exclude the testimony
of Vonage’s invalidity expert, Vonage’s counsel merely discussed enable-
ment, but not written description.107  Additionally, Vonage’s opposition brief
to Sprint’s motion for partial summary judgment appeared to confuse the
indefiniteness and written description doctrines.108  In the very likely event
that Vonage did not lodge a separate defense of written description at sum-
mary judgment, this failure appears to be a critical oversight, because the
inventor of the patents-in-suit “regarded his invention as being directed to an
ATM system rather than including the Internet as a component.”109  Such a
statement seems the essence of a lack of “possession” of the “claimed subject
matter.”110  In other words, it appears the specification did not describe “the
claimed invention with all of its limitations using such descriptive means as
words, structures, figures, diagrams, and formulas that fully set forth the
claimed invention.”111  Although “[t]he subject matter of the claim need not
be described literally (i.e., using the same terms or in haec verba),” the patents
would have needed to disclose sufficient material to “clearly allow persons of
ordinary skill in the art to recognize” that the specification related to any type
tion defense.  Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290,
1328–32 (D. Kan. 2007).  Vonage apparently raised the defense at trial, but winning a
written description argument in front of a jury is arguably a tall order, given the difficulty
of conveying the differences between written description and enablement. See Sprint’s
Response in Opposition to Vonage’s Trial Brief Regarding Enablement & Written Descrip-
tion at 1, Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (No. 05-2433-JWL), 2007 WL 2821706 (attempting to
exclude Vonage’s proffered arguments on written description at trial).
107 See Vonage Am., Inc. & Vonage Holdings Corp.’s Memorandum in Opposition to
Sprint Communications Co., L.P.’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Vonage’s Expert
Frank Koperda, Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (No. 05-2433-JWL), 2007 WL 2821698.
108 Vonage’s Memorandum in Opposition to Sprint’s Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment at 6, Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (No. 05-2433-JWL), 2007 WL 2813950.  Specifically,
Vonage argued that the fact that “[e]very document authored by Mr. Christie states that
his invention was directed to an ATM system for voice communication” supports a rejec-
tion under § 112, ¶ 2 (indefiniteness), rather than the much stronger argument for failure
to meet ¶ 1 (written description/enablement). See id.
109 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1332 (“Vonage directs the court to evidence which it
contends shows that Mr. Christie regarded his invention as being directed to an ATM sys-
tem rather than including the Internet as a component.  This evidence consists of docu-
ments authored by Mr. Christie as well as the deposition testimony of a Sprint employee
and one of Sprint’s patent attorneys.”).
110 Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quot-
ing In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(noting that “the test for sufficiency of support in a parent application is whether the
disclosure of the application relied upon ‘reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inven-
tor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter’” (quoting In re Kaslow,
707 F.2d at 1375)).
111 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2163.02 (9th ed. 2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/s2163.html (citing Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
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of network, including IP networks.112  Because the patents’ disclosure
described “the invention” as relating solely to ATM networks—which was
apparently supported by statements from the inventor and other Sprint engi-
neers—and portions of the patents were construed to cover non-ATM net-
works, it is unlikely that Sprint satisfied the written description
requirement.113
Vonage’s apparent failure to mount a solid written description defense
was not its only critical omission.  In particular, according to the district
court, “Vonage built its VoIP telephony system with the technical advice of,
and using components purchased from, Cisco.”114  Importantly, Sprint and
Cisco had executed an “Alliance Agreement” that provided for the “joint
development and ownership of products and intellectual property relating to
the asserted patents.”115  In the agreement, “Sprint agreed to license to
Cisco . . . patents,” including the patents-in-suit, and “covenanted not to sue
Cisco customers for infringement of any [licensed] patent.”116  Based on the
Sprint-Cisco agreement, Vonage arguably had viable implied license and
exhaustion defenses, even before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Quanta v.
LG.117  Yet, inexplicably—although Vonage’s counsel had received the
Sprint-Cisco agreement two months before the close of discovery—Vonage’s
counsel waited until the last day of discovery to move to amend its answer to
include these defenses.118  As a result, the magistrate judge rejected Vonage’s
motion to amend its answer, which the district court subsequently upheld.119
112 Id. (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
113 Moreover, as I describe further below, although there is some basis to believe the
specification disclosed a “structure” relating to IP networks—even if this basis were suffi-
cient to support claims over IP networks—it would preclude any theory of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents under the “dedication” rule. See infra notes 136–38 and
accompanying text.  Thus, even if Sprint failed on a written description defense, the same
arguments would have very likely knocked out three patents that the court found were not
literally infringed. See infra notes 136–38.
114 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See generally Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (discuss-
ing the doctrines of patent exhaustion and implied license).
118 See Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1347 (“[The magistrate judge] noted that Vonage’s
motion was filed on the last day of discovery in the case over two months after Sprint
produced the purportedly ‘newly discovered’ documents, and implicitly rejected Vonage’s
justification that it had been busy pursuing follow-up discovery.”); cf. Vonage Am., Inc. &
Vonage Holdings Corp.’s Memorandum in Opposition to Sprint Communication Co.’s
Motions in Limine at 16, Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (No. 05-2433-JWL), 2007 WL 5189617
(“Vonage purchased a substantial number of the components in its system from Cisco,
[and] any remark that Cisco instructed Vonage how to assemble its system, and any sugges-
tion that the $1 million per patent royalty evidenced by the Sprint/Cisco agreements is
material to the determination of an established royalty for the Asserted Patents.”).
119 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1348–49.
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c. A Meager Summary Judgment Motion (and More Missed
Defenses)
Vonage’s tactical daftness continued at the summary judgment stage.
The court began by stating that it “was struck by many . . . deficiencies in
Vonage’s brief.”120  It noted that a substantial portion of Vonage’s brief
failed to comply with local rules governing motions for summary judgment,
because they were “largely cluttered with improper attorney argument and
commentary as well as legal conclusions, none of which are ‘facts as would be
admissible in evidence.’”121  Indeed, the court lambasted Vonage for its
poorly drafted brief, stating:
It contains mostly argument, attorney commentary, and conclusory state-
ments regarding the patents and technology at issue, with only cursory cita-
tions to the record.  Vonage’s purported “factual” description of the Sprint
patents in Section II is actually attorney argument that roughly paraphrases
the patent disclosures to support Vonage’s contentions in this case and,
notably, selectively omits those portions of the patents which do not. . . .
Additionally, it is even more troubling because it contains paragraphs, some
of which are lengthy, which purport to describe Vonage’s technologically
complex system with nothing more than a single cursory citation to the
record at the end of each paragraph.  This makes it virtually impossible for
the court to determine what, if any, portions of the record Vonage is relying
on to support each of the statements which allegedly describes its system. . . .
. . . Vonage has no legitimate excuse for its decision to ignore these
rules, as Vonage is represented by sophisticated counsel and competent local
counsel who should be familiar with this court’s rules governing summary
judgment practice. . . .  Accordingly, the court will grant Sprint’s motion to
the extent that it will largely disregard the arguments set forth in Sections II,
III, and IV of Vonage’s brief.122
With the court predisposed to Sprint’s arguments—not to mention the
court’s decision to “largely disregard” most of Vonage’s arguments for proce-
dural reasons—the court decided in favor of Sprint on summary judgment
for all but its weakest arguments.123
First, the court incorporated Sprint’s hyperbole regarding the impor-
tance of the patents-in-suit, stating that the invention in the patents “was sig-
nificant in that it had the potential to render obsolete major components
within the PSTN, breaking the grip that a handful of switch manufacturers
held on service providers like Sprint.”124  In reality, the invention appeared
to be well known in the art (see below), and the court failed to note that
Sprint never even practiced the putatively “significant” patents-in-suit.125
120 Id. at 1303.
121 Id. at 1304.
122 Id. at 1304–05.
123 See id. at 1316–45 (analyzing the various motions for summary judgment).
124 Id. at 1301.
125 See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 77 (noting that Sprint never practiced
the patents-in-suit).
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Second, on claim construction issues, the court pointed out repeatedly
that Vonage improperly read limitations from the specification into the claim
language.126  Nonetheless, Vonage was successful in its effort to limit the
scope of the term “interworking device,” which the court interpreted as lim-
ited to “an ATM interworking multiplexer.”127  In particular, citing the Fed-
eral Circuit’s decision in Honeywell International v. ITT Industries,128 the court
narrowed the plain meaning of the term, because it found the common spec-
ification of the patents-in-suit described “the invention” as providing “virtual
connections through an ATM interworking multiplexer.”129
Vonage’s win on “interworking device” set the stage for it to knock out
three of seven asserted patents based on non-infringement arguments,
because its network operates across IP—not ATM—networks.130  Clearly,
with such an interpretation, there could be no literal infringement of these
three patents, and the court was quick to recognize as much.131  Yet the court
found that material disputes of fact remained on the doctrine of
equivalents.132  As an initial matter, Vonage missed an opportunity to elimi-
nate the doctrine of equivalents as a theory of infringement.  In particular,
under the Supreme Court’s decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu, amendments
made during patent prosecution typically preclude reliance on the doctrine
of equivalents.133  However, because Vonage raised this argument only in its
126 See Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1310–15 (“Given the clarity of the language of the
claim terms themselves, then, the court will not import this limitation from the specifica-
tion into the claims.”).  After the summary judgment order issued, in a pretrial order, the
court construed a number of additional terms and addressed several other arguments. See
Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1310–23 (D. Kan.
2007).  I briefly address this order below in the description of the trial phase. See infra
subsection II.B.1.d.
127 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 (“Given the clarity of the written description con-
cerning the meaning of the claim term ‘interworking device,’ then, the court construes
this claim term to mean ATM interworking multiplexer.”).
128 452 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
129 See Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1310–11 (emphasis added).
130 See id. at 1300 (“Sprint Communications Company L.P. alleges that the voice over
internet protocol telephony system of defendants Vonage Holdings Corp. and Vonage
America, Inc. (Vonage) infringes sixty-one claims of seven telecommunications patents
owned by Sprint.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1310.
131 See id. at 1316–18 (“It is undisputed that Vonage’s allegedly infringing system does
not use ATM technology and, therefore, does not contain such a device.  Thus, a rational
trier of fact could not find based on the summary judgment record that Vonage’s system
infringes this claim limitation.  As such, summary judgment is granted on the issue of lit-
eral infringement.”).
132 See id. at 1317 (“Nonetheless, summary judgment is not warranted on the issue of
infringement of this limitation under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
133 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737–38
(2002) (holding that prosecution history estoppel limits the scope of the doctrine of
equivalents).
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summary judgment reply brief, the court found that it was waived and disre-
garded it.134
With the doctrine of equivalents in play, the court found that “Sprint has
raised a genuine issue of material fact” of whether Vonage’s technology satis-
fied the standard “function/way/result” test typically used to determine
whether an accused product is “equivalent” to the asserted patent claims.135
Although one could debate whether the court should have held that a rea-
sonable juror could find that the “way” Vonage’s gateways worked were sub-
stantially the same as that in Sprint’s claims, the court noticeably failed to
consider whether Sprint effectively disclosed, but failed to claim, “IP
interworking devices” in the specifications of the patents-in-suit.136  This was
potentially a critical oversight, because it is black-letter law that “when a pat-
ent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter . . . this action dedi-
cates that unclaimed subject matter to the public.”137  Although the
applicable patents-in-suit did not expressly disclose IP interworking devices,
they did disclose the use of the Internet “IP” protocol several times.138  More-
over, while the advent of full-blown IP gateways was a few years away, IP
“interworking devices” were well known in the prior art at the time of the
priority date of the patents-in-suit.  For example, I located a patent assigned
to Motorola filed in 1993 that discloses a telephone that includes an
“Interworking Function,” which connects it between a traditional PSTN tele-
phone network and a data network.139  The Motorola patent further dis-
closes connecting the telephone to a TCP/IP network.140  Although these
facts are not decisive, Vonage could have likely made a solid argument that
one of skill in the art would have read Sprint’s patents at issue to have dis-
closed, but not claimed, IP interworking devices.141  Because the claim term
134 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (“Vonage cannot satisfy its initial summary judgment
burden by relying on arguments it did not raise for the first time until its reply brief where
Sprint has not had an opportunity to respond to those arguments.”).  Assuming Sprint had
amended the claims in the patents-in-suit in response to prior art, since IP interworking
devices were clearly foreseeable at the time of the amendment, it seems very likely that
Festo would have precluded doctrine of equivalents. See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 738 (“There
is no reason why a narrowing amendment should be deemed to relinquish equivalents
unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of what was
surrendered.”).
135 See Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1316–18 (citing Aquatex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche
Solutions, 419 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
136 See id.
137 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en banc).
138 See U.S. Patent No. 6,665,294 col. 4 ll. 20–23, col. 6 ll. 20–25, col. 10 ll. 16–21, col.
11 ll. 19–28, col. 15 ll. 27–31 (filed Aug. 5, 2002).
139 See U.S. Patent No. 5,426,643 col. 3. ll. 12–19 (filed Nov. 1, 1993).
140 See id. at col. 1 ll. 25–44.
141 See PSC Computer Prod., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“We thus hold that if one of ordinary skill in the art can understand the unclaimed
disclosed teaching upon reading the written description, the alternative matter disclosed
has been dedicated to the public.”).
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was construed as covering only “ATM interworking devices,” it seems very
likely that Vonage did not present such an argument or evidence on sum-
mary judgment,142 but that had it done so,143 it might have prevented Sprint
from relying on the doctrine of equivalents.144
As mentioned earlier, it appears that Vonage failed to raise a written
description defense on summary judgment.145  Yet, Vonage likely had a
strong defense of lack of written description, because the sole inventor of the
patents-in-suit had apparently admitted that he viewed his invention as only
applying to ATM, not IP, networks.146  Although this defense is ultimately a
question of fact147—presumably, the underlying facts were not genuinely dis-
puted.  As such, it seems Vonage made a tactical mistake not arguing for
summary judgment of invalidity of all asserted patents on this ground.  At the
very least, evidence of lack of written description would likely have more
favorably colored the judge’s findings on non-infringement, particularly the
doctrine of equivalents.148  Of course, the publicly available pleadings indi-
cate that Vonage’s counsel did not even recognize written description as a
defense separate from non-enablement and indefiniteness, and this potential
oversight may explain Vonage’s failure to lodge it at summary judgment, not
to mention its failure to sufficiently develop the facts to do so.149
Vonage also failed to raise any anticipation or obviousness defenses at
summary judgment.150  Despite the seemingly wide array of available prior
art, Vonage was unable to find anything suitable to support a summary judg-
142 Vonage filed its motion for summary judgment and supporting brief under seal. See
Defendants Vonage Holdings Corp. & Vonage Am., Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Kan. 2007) (No.
05-2433-JWL).  However, given the apparent strength of the “unclaimed matter” argu-
ment—and the notable absence of any discussion of the issue in the court’s summary judg-
ment order—it is very likely it did not present it to the court. Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290.
143 Vonage’s apparent inability to assert strong arguments on the doctrine of
equivalents was also apparent in the court’s opinion for another patent-in-suit, in which it
stated: “[Vonage’s] argument is so cursory and undeveloped that the court could not even
begin to find that Vonage is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on this theory.”
Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.
144 Sprint also waived other potentially decisive non-infringement defenses. See, e.g., id.
at 1326 (“Once again, the court will not consider this argument because it was not raised
for the first time until Vonage’s reply.”).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 106–113.
146 See supra text accompanying notes 106–113.
147 See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Written
description is a question of fact, judged from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the
art as of the relevant filing date.”).
148 Cf. Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inad-
missible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251,
1251–52 (2005) (“[J]udges are generally unable to avoid being influenced by relevant but
inadmissible information of which they are aware.”).
149 See supra text accompanying note 108.
150 See supra text accompanying note 87.
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ment motion.151  This omission is particularly notable because just a few
months earlier the Supreme Court had issued its landmark opinion in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,152 providing a firm basis for judges to invali-
date patents at the summary judgment stage on grounds of obviousness.153  If
Vonage had further developed what appeared to be a relatively meager col-
lection of prior art, it arguably would have been able to file a strong motion
for invalidity due to obviousness.  Presumably, part of its failure to do so
stemmed from its experts’ lack of familiarity with the technology of the pat-
ents-in-suit.154
Vonage’s ostensible fumbling at summary judgment is evidenced further
by Sprint’s success in excluding a number of Vonage’s proffered defenses.  In
particular, the court granted Sprint’s motion on Vonage’s asserted defense of
claim indefiniteness.155  Indefiniteness at that time was difficult to show
because it required that the claims be “insolubly ambiguous,”156 and for this
very reason, it was not usually successful as a defense.157  Not only was the
claim language well outside this narrow standard, the district court found
that Vonage’s expert “report provided no opinion or analysis on this
defense.”158  Next, the court easily rejected Vonage’s laches, estoppel, acqui-
escence, misuse, unclean hands, and patentable subject matter defenses,
mainly because Vonage introduced no facts that could support them159—but
151 See supra text accompanying note 103.
152 550 U.S. 398, 401–02, 419–20 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “rigid” teach-
ing-suggestion-motivation approach as the core test for obviousness).
153 See id. at 427 (“Where, as here, the content of the prior art, the scope of the patent
claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the art are not in material dispute, and the obvi-
ousness of the claim is apparent in light of these factors, summary judgment is
appropriate.”).
154 See supra subsection I.B.1.a.
155 Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1333 (D.
Kan. 2007) (“But, the fact that the parties may disagree on the correct meaning of those
claim terms does not render them indefinite.  The critical point is that Vonage has not
directed the court’s attention to any particular claim terms that it contends are not amena-
ble to construction, which as explained above is the applicable legal standard for invalidity
under § 112, ¶ 2.”).
156 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“[A] claim is indefinite under § 112 ¶ 2 if it is ‘insolubly ambiguous, and no narrowing
construction can properly be adopted.’” (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).  Since that time, the Supreme Court has
weakened the standard for indefiniteness, holding that “a patent is invalid for indefinite-
ness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecu-
tion history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the
scope of the invention.”  Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124
(2014).
157 UNIV. OF HOUS. LAW CTR., Decisions for 2005–2009, PATSTATS.ORG, http://www.pat
stats.org/2005-2009_composite.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (showing that, at the dis-
trict court level, accused infringers raised the defense only in 78 decided cases over the
period 2005–2009 and prevailed only 38% of the time).
158 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
159 See id. at 1333–42.
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also because the court prevented Vonage from relying on the Sprint-Cisco
licensing agreement.160  In this regard, the court pointed out Vonage’s con-
fusion between a laches defense, which relates to when suit is filed, and a
prosecution laches defense, which relates to the amount of time a patentee
spends prosecuting its patent.161
Additionally, the court chastised Vonage once again for its failure to
meet imposed deadlines:
The court might be willing to put the parties to this inconvenience if
Vonage had offered a legitimate justification for its belated reliance on the
prosecution histories as the basis for its laches defense.  Significantly, how-
ever, Vonage has not done so.  In this respect, it is important to note that
Vonage’s approach to this issue is not unique.  Rather, it is entirely typical of
the manner in which Vonage has approached the entire pretrial phase of
this case.  Vonage has repeatedly raised arguments in a belated fashion and
has engaged in tactics which the court believes are designed to delay the trial
of this case.  Its overall approach leads the court to believe that either (1)
Vonage has not adequately prepared this case for trial, or (2) Vonage is
attempting to benefit from “hide-the-ball” tactics.  The court discounts the
likelihood that Vonage is unprepared, as Vonage is represented by counsel
who are undoubtedly well versed in patent litigation as well as the disclosure
and supplementation requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, the court can only conclude that Vonage’s belated assertion of this
patent prosecution defense theory must have been a strategic litigation
decision.162
As some consolation, the court did leave intact Vonage’s marking
defense because, although Sprint did not practice the patents, its licensee
Cisco possibly did.163  Of course, because Vonage could not introduce evi-
dence of the Sprint-Cisco licensing agreement, its win here was essentially
moot.164  And while Vonage’s non-infringement expert was perhaps a poor
hire—and apparently did not even possess skill in the art that he set out as
applicable in his own expert report165—the court, perhaps taking pity on
160 Id. at 1335–36 (“Vonage explains that it cannot present this evidence in support of
its opposition to Sprint’s motion for summary judgment because Magistrate Judge Waxse
struck from the pretrial order all references to the Sprint/Cisco agreements, including
Vonage’s contentions in support of its defense of estoppel.”).
161 See id. at 1337 (“The court will assume, without deciding, that Vonage’s assertion of
a general laches defense in its amended answers was sufficient to also set forth the defense
of prosecution laches.  Even so, it is important to note that the factual underpinnings of
these two defenses are quite distinct.”).
162 Id. at 1338–39.
163 See id. at 1341–42 (“Indeed, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Vonage, as the court must on Sprint’s motion for summary judgment, a rational trier of
fact could conclude that Cisco has done so.”).
164 See id. at 1334–35 (noting that Vonage relied on the “Sprint/Cisco agreements” in
support of its marking arguments).
165 See Sprint’s Brief in Support of Its Motion to Exclude, supra note 95, at 6.  Specifi-
cally, Sprint quotes Halpern’s expert report that states:
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Vonage at this point in the opinion, decided nonetheless that he passed
Daubert muster.166
In sum, Vonage failed to raise or waived not just one, but several seem-
ingly strong defenses at summary judgment.  Its behavior was so notable that
the court rebuked Vonage for its “cursory citations,” selective omissions,
“decision to ignore the[ ] rules,” “belated” arguments, and “hide-the-ball tac-
tics.”167  Sprint, on the other hand, won on most of the issues it raised, elimi-
nating a large number of potential defenses from the case.  With such a one-
sided result, the parties headed into trial with the odds strongly favoring
Sprint.
d. Vonage’s Trial Loss and Ultimate Settlement
At trial, Vonage was in a precarious situation.  In addition to losing key
arguments at summary judgment, Vonage lost potentially decisive issues in an
important pretrial order construing further claim terms and rejecting its
prosecution history estoppel arguments.168  Ultimately, the jury found
infringement of all fourteen claims at issue in six different patents and held
none of the claims were invalid.169  It awarded $69.5 million in damages for
past infringement at a 5% reasonable royalty rate, which applied to future
sales.170  Sprint then moved to modify the judgment to include an injunction
against future infringement.171  Before the court ruled, the parties settled for
an estimated $80 million.172  Presumably, part of the settlement was driven
by a set of patents that Vonage purchased from Digital Packet Licensing,
which had a pending infringement suit against Sprint, as well as AT&T and
A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the effective filing dates of the
Sprint Patents would have had a bachelors degree in electrical engineering, com-
puter engineering or computer science, and at least three years experience in the
telecommunications industry.  The person would also have some familiarity with
narrowband and broadband networks, telecommunications signaling require-
ments and the Public Switched Telephone Network (“PSTN”).
Id. at 3–4.  Halpern did not appear to have familiarity with signaling requirements for the
PSTN. Id. at 5.
166 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1342–45 (noting that the Supreme Court has instructed
district courts to perform a “gatekeeping” function by restricting expert testimony to that
by witnesses qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” (quoting
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588, 597 (1993))).
167 See supra text accompanying notes 122, 162.
168 Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1323–27 (D.
Kan. 2007) (memorandum and order).
169 Verdict at 1–7, Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (No. 05-2433-JWL), 2007 WL 2790718.
170 Id. at 6.
171 Sprint’s Motion to Modify Judgment to Include Permanent Injunction, Sprint, 500
F. Supp. 2d 1290 (No. 05-2433-JWL).
172 See Nathan Eddy, Vonage, AT&T Agree on Patent Lawsuit Settlement, CRN (Dec. 26,
2007, 2:14 PM), http://archive.today/BH6T.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 29 30-DEC-14 16:13
2014] the  vonage  trilogy 571
Nortel Networks.173  Before settlement, there were reports that Sprint might
purchase Vonage as part of settling the case, but no deal was
consummated.174
2. Verizon v. Vonage
The Verizon suit was similar in many ways to the Sprint suit.175  After
Vonage had taken away hundreds of thousands of Verizon subscribers,176
Verizon sued Vonage for patent infringement in June 2006 in the so-called
“rocket docket” of the Eastern District of Virginia.177  The seven patents at
issue covered gateway interfaces between packet-switched networks, like the
Internet, and circuit-switched networks, like the PSTN;178 billing and fraud
detection;179 call forwarding and voicemail;180 and the use of Wi-Fi cordless
handsets on a VoIP network.181
In the midst of discovery and pretrial disputes, the parties briefed claim
construction issues.182  Overall, the district court construed the disputed
claim terms broadly.183  A few days later the court denied both parties sum-
mary judgment.184  Unfortunately, a copy of the order is neither available
173 Shawn Young, Vonage Buys Three Internet Phone Service Patents, WALL ST. J. (July 11,
2006, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB115254076792402306.
174 Eric Savitz, Vonage Up on Inexplicable Rumors Sprint May Buy It, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr.
18, 2007, 4:20 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/32645-vonage-up-on-inexplicable-
rumors-sprint-may-buy-it.
175 However, because of the few available electronic documents in the Verizon case as
well as space considerations, I recount this case in much less detail than the Sprint case.
176 See supra text accompanying note 66.
177 Complaint for Injunctive & Other Relief, Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings
Corp., No. 06-0682, 2007 WL 528749 (E.D. Va. 2007), 2006 WL 1682996.
178 U.S. Patent Nos. 6,104,711 (filed Mar. 6, 1997), 6,282,574 (filed Feb. 24, 2000),
6,128,304 (filed Oct. 23, 1998).
179 U.S. Patent Nos. 6,430,275 (filed July 28, 1999), 6,137,869 (filed Sept. 16, 1997).
180 U.S. Patent No. 6,298,062 (filed Oct. 23, 1998).
181 U.S. Patent No. 6,359,880 (filed July 30, 1999).
182 Verizon’s Opening Claim Construction Brief, Verizon, No. 06-0682, 2007 WL 528749
(E.D. Va. 2007); Defendants’ Opening Claim Construction Brief, Verizon, No. 06-0682,
2007 WL 528749 (E.D. Va. 2007).
183 Verizon, No. 06-0682, 2007 WL 528749, at *3.  For instance, the court construed
“maintaining by said unitary logical object of a record of the . . . progress” as
“[m]aintaining by a single logical database, which includes related call processing logic
and supporting infrastructure, a record of call status (e.g., setup, in progress, termination)
that can be used for billing, usage tracking, and other purposes.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).  Because “unitary logical object” was interpreted as a “single logical
database,” presumably a distributed database with multiple sub-databases connected “logi-
cally” into one database would meet the limitation. See id.  As the remainder of the limita-
tion concerns standard functions in telecommunications systems, any VoIP system
designed to support end-user subscribers would have likely met the court’s interpretation
of this claim element. See, e.g., RICHARD SWALE, VOICE OVER IP: SYSTEMS AND SOLUTIONS
248, 317–20, 390 (2001) (describing call status, billing, usage tracking, and service logic).
184 Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment, Verizon, No. 06-0682, 2007 WL
528749.
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from the federal courts’ PACER database nor Westlaw or Lexis.  However,
based on a review of the docket in the case, Vonage apparently filed only a
summary judgment motion of non-infringement, but not invalidity.185  In
this regard, Vonage hired the same invalidity expert as in the Sprint case,
Frank Koperda, who as I recounted earlier had some experience in interfac-
ing traditional telephony platforms with digital networks, but not since the
mid-1980s.186  Like the Sprint case, presumably Koperda’s lack of recent
experience weakened Vonage’s invalidity case.187
After a several week trial, the jury found that Vonage infringed three of
Verizon’s patents.  Overall, it awarded $58 million in reasonable royalties for
past infringement and a 5.5% royalty rate on future sales.188  Subsequently,
the court granted an injunction against future infringement,189 which the
Federal Circuit subsequently stayed pending appeal.190  On appeal, the Fed-
eral Circuit upheld claim constructions on two of the three patents, affirmed
the findings of infringement and validity, and reversed and remanded on
one of the patents.191  With the injunction in place from the two infringed
patents, Vonage decided to settle the case for between $80 and $120
million.192
3. AT&T v. Vonage
After Vonage had settled the suits filed by Sprint and Verizon, totaling
over $160 million,193 less than one month later, AT&T launched a suit
against it in another rocket docket, the Western District of Wisconsin.194
Like the Sprint patents, AT&T’s patent disclosed telephony across an ATM
network but contained claims not expressly limited to any type of network.195
185 Id.
186 See supra text accompanying note 99.
187 See id.
188 Verdict Form at 4, Verizon, No. 06-0682, 2007 WL 528749 (E.D. Va. 2007), 2007 WL
1751100.
189 Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 228 F. App’x 986, 986 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (per curiam).
190 Id.
191 Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
192 Anne Broache, Vonage, Verizon Settle Patent Spat for Up to $120 Million, CNET (Oct.
25, 2007, 1:47 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9804709-7.html.  If Vonage were
such a competitive threat to Verizon, one might wonder why Verizon did not leave its
injunction in place, thereby shutting down Vonage entirely.  In this regard, Vonage had
stated that it could implement a non-infringing design-around to avoid infringing Ver-
izon’s patents. See id.  Presumably, Verizon decided that a settlement was preferable to the
risk that Vonage could switch to a non-infringing alternative.
193 See Eddy, supra note 172.
194 Complaint, AT&T Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-CV-00585 (W.D. Wis.
Oct. 17, 2007).
195 See generally U.S. Patent No. 6,487,200 (filed Apr. 4, 1996) (showing that AT&T’s
patent contained claims not expressly limited to any type of network).
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(Because I represented Vonage in this matter, I have chosen to refrain from
a detailed analysis of infringement, invalidity, and enforceability.)  Although
at least some industry observers believed that Vonage had a strong defense of
non-infringement and invalidity,196 it quickly settled the case for about $40
million.197  Presumably, Vonage had become skeptical by that point of its
ability to convince judges and juries that the patents asserted against it were
invalid or unenforceable, or that its technology was sufficiently different from
traditional packet networks, like ATM networks, so as not to infringe.  Assum-
ing as much, Vonage’s decision to settle was certainly understandable.
C. The Aftermath of the Trilogy and Subsequent Cases
Following the settlements of roughly $200 million,198 which was about
one quarter of Vonage’s annual revenue at the time,199 Vonage’s marketing
expenditures decreased and its subscriber growth slowed substantially.200
Indeed, Vonage was almost delisted from the New York Stock Exchange,201
and some observers predicted bankruptcy.202  From the time of Vonage’s
IPO (about seven months after the Sprint suit was filed) through the AT&T
settlement, its stock price declined from $17 per share to about $2 per
share.203  Although other factors certainly accounted for the decline,204 the
trilogy of lawsuits arguably played a major role, particularly given the substan-
tial declines in Vonage’s stock price following unfavorable rulings in the
cases.205
The highly damaging effects imposed on Vonage by the patent bully car-
riers stand in contrast to the relative minor effects of a series of suits filed
against Vonage before and afterward by a variety of non-practicing entities
196 See Masnick, supra note 103.
197 See Eddy, supra note 172.
198 See id.
199 Vonage Holdings Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 40, (Mar. 17, 2008), availa-
ble at http://ir.vonage.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-08-59036.
200 David Shabelman, Some Hope for Vonage, THEDEAL.COM (Nov. 9, 2007), available at
LEXIS, News-All file database; see also Seth Wallis-Jones, Growth Slows but Vonage Trims Losses
on Path to Profits, GLOBAL INSIGHT (Feb. 14, 2008), available at LEXIS, News-All file database.
201 See Joa˜o-Pierre S. Ruth, Vonage Faces Hangup from Stock Exchange, NJBIZ (Feb. 16,
2009), available at 2009 WLNR 3234320.
202 See Shabelman, supra note 200.
203 See Vonage Holdings Corporation (VG), YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/e
charts?s=VG+Interactive#chart3:symbol=vg;range=my;charttype=line;crosshair=on;ohlcval
ues=0;logscale=off;source=undefined (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
204 See Blevins, supra note 36, at 119–20 (cataloguing technological and regulatory
problems that affected Vonage).
205 See id. at 120 (“While these [other] problems certainly contributed to Vonage’s
problems, the patent litigation threat posed a more serious and even existential threat.”);
id. at 119 (“News of these decisions drove Vonage’s stock to around one dollar, its historic
low at the time.”); Todd R. Weiss, Vonage CEO Resigns; Company Moves to Cut Costs, COM-
PUTERWORLD (Apr. 12, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2544667/
networking/vonage-ceo-resigns—company-moves-to-cut-costs.html (reporting that Von-
age’s stock dropped 24% following the injunction in the Verizon case).
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(NPEs).  Overall, Vonage was involved in three different NPE suits around
the time of the trilogy, all of which settled.206  However, unlike the suits filed
by the incumbent carriers, none of the NPEs extracted a large toll from
Vonage.207  So, at least for Vonage, the “bullies” inflicted much more dam-
age than the “trolls.”
Furthermore, Vonage did not fare so well in the infringement suits
involving patents it purchased to fend off Sprint.  In those suits, Digital
Packet Licensing—the original plaintiff—sued Sprint, AT&T, Nortel, MCI,
and others.208  After Vonage acquired the patents, Nortel shrewdly asserted a
number of patents of its own against Vonage.209  Ultimately, the cases settled
with Vonage and Nortel licensing their patents to each other for no fee,210
and Vonage appeared to collect little to nothing from the other defend-
ants.211  Of course, Vonage likely spent millions in litigation fees on the
cases.212
206 Web Telephony, LLC. v. Bell Atl. Commc’ns, Inc., No. 07-CV-00085 (E.D. Tex. dis-
missed June 23, 2008); Klausner Technologies, Inc. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 06-CV-
00275 (E.D. Tex. dismissed Oct. 31, 2007); Rates Tech. Inc. v. Vonage Am., Inc., No. 05-
CV-04727 (E.D.N.Y. dismissed Mar. 9, 2007).
207 See Vonage Holdings Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 9, (Nov. 14, 2007),
available at http://ir.vonage.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-07-247563 (noting that
neither the Rates Technology nor the Klausner Technologies settlements were “material”
transactions); 8x8, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 29, (May 27, 2010), available at
http://investors.8x8.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1136261-10-121 (“As part of the settle-
ment, we agreed to pay eight quarterly payments totaling $800,000 over the next two years
between April 2009 and December 2010.  Under the transaction, we expensed $339,000 of
the patent settlement costs during the year ended March 31, 2009 that were related to
benefits received by us in and during the periods prior to fiscal year 2009.  We recorded
the remaining license fee of $432,000 as other long term assets as of March 31, 2009 and
we are amortizing this amount to cost of service revenues in the Consolidated Statements
of Operations over the remaining life of the primary patent, which expires in September
2017.”).
208 Vonage Holdings Corp. v. MCI, Inc., No. 05-CV-00451 (E.D. Tex. dismissed June 15,
2007).
209 Nortel’s Answer and Counterclaims at 7–9, Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Nortel Net-
works, Inc., No. 07-507 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2007).
210 See Vonage and Nortel Settle Patent Dispute, REUTERS (Dec. 31, 2007, 5:10 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2007/12/31/us-vonage-patentdispute-idUSWNAS541520071231
(“Vonage Holdings Corp . . . said it has agreed to settle a patent dispute with Nortel Net-
works . . . with no payment of damages, sending its share up more than 8 percent.”).
211 I could find no reports of the settlement amounts with these defendants, but pre-
sumably if the amounts had been large, they would have been reported in Vonage’s public
filings. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2013) (stating that public companies must disclose to the
SEC in their annual reports “material pending legal proceedings”).
212 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 25–26
(2007) (reporting patent infringement suits with more than $25 million at stake have
median defense costs through trial of $5 million).
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CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRILOGY AND THE NEED
FOR FURTHER STUDY
As I have recounted, Vonage—a startup company providing a highly
competitive, low-cost telephone service that drew millions of subscribers away
from the incumbent carriers—did not fare well in the U.S. patent system.213
Most importantly, Vonage paid out roughly $200 million in settlement
amounts, plus millions in attorneys’ fees, placing it at the brink of insol-
vency.214  Although Vonage ultimately escaped the “death penalty,” its value
decreased precipitously, and the suits very likely caused permanent damage
to the health of the company.215
One might quip, if Vonage lost its Sprint and Verizon cases, then the
payout was deserved.  However, as I describe above, much of Vonage’s woes
in the Sprint case appeared to stem from tactical errors.216  Presumably,
those errors were driven in large part by Vonage’s limited litigation budget
and inexperience in patent suits, especially compared with Sprint’s very large
budget and extensive litigation experience.217  These sorts of differentials
among litigants highlight a problem in the patent bullying context not pre-
sent in the patent troll context—namely, that patent bullies not only can
force settlements in weak cases, but in fact can win at judgment in weak
cases.218  The ability of patent bullies to achieve such results, of course, com-
pounds the distortions already present in patent litigation and licensing.219
Indeed, the so-called “trolls”—which were much smaller than Sprint and Ver-
izon—did not achieve results as favorable against Vonage.220  Nor do trolls
use litigation to acquire competitors at bargain basement prices—which
Sprint apparently considered.221  Furthermore, when Vonage attempted to
cash out on its patents against Nortel Networks, it was smacked right back,
and ultimately settled for nothing.222
Generalizing from the Vonage trilogy, a few important problems for the
patent system as a whole emerge.  First, like the trolls, patent bullies can take
advantage of high litigation costs and the complexity of patent litigation to
213 See supra Part I.
214 See supra text accompanying notes 198–205.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 198–205.
216 See supra Sections I.A–D.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 70–73 (describing the asymmetries between
Vonage and Sprint).
218 See Jennifer F. Miller, Note, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, 2004 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 4, ¶ 32 (“One byproduct of speculation that juries are unable to comprehend
the subject matter of patent infringement cases is the concern that the decisions they
render are arbitrary, unpredictable, and based on considerations other than the relevant
law.”).
219 See supra notes 19–31 and accompanying text.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 206–207.
221 See supra text accompanying note 174.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 209–212.
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gain leverage in suits over smaller defendants.223  Importantly, this leverage
can stem from bullies’ increased odds of winning otherwise “weak” suits.224
And, unlike the troll context, patent bullies will ordinarily be entitled to
injunctions.225  Coupled with the high risk aversion of many small defend-
ants, these advantages can place extreme pressure on defendants to settle, or
result in inaccurate judgments, leading to substantial economically distorting
effects.226  Second, also unlike the troll context, settlements and judgments
with bullies do not only result in money changing hands.  Rather, bullies
often desire to acquire a smaller competitor’s technology, either through a
coerced license or a forced purchase of the competitor’s entire company.227
Arguably, these results can wreak even more damage on the competitive envi-
ronment than suits by trolls.228
223 See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspec-
tive, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2008) (“[T]he PTO’s issuance of broad patents has
allowed Verizon and other incumbent providers to pursue via government-granted prop-
erty rights what they have been unable to achieve via FCC regulation.”); Cheryl Milone,
Stopping Abusive Patent Litigants, Not Innovation, FED. LAW. Oct./Nov. 2013, at 38, 42 (quot-
ing a patent litigator as stating: “It is not easy for a district court judge to stop what trolls
rely upon—namely, the use of litigation expense and leverage to extract settlements.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
224 See Meurer, supra note 41, at 515 (“[A] weak lawsuit . . . may impose [significant
costs] on the defendant.  A defendant may settle an opportunistic lawsuit to avoid the
nuisance of mounting a defense.”).
225 See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (2012) (finding that practicing entities secured injunctions 79%
of the time compared to PAEs 26% of the time in district courts from July 2006 through
August 2011); Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1943, 2007 (2009) (“[I]t is noteworthy that the Federal Circuit was inhospitable to
Vonage’s argument that an injunction should not issue to block its use of Verizon’s pat-
ented interface because of the impacts of the injunction for millions of users of its VoIP
services.  In the post-eBay caselaw thus far, injunctive relief has generally been withheld
only in cases that appear to involve ‘patent trolls.’” (footnotes omitted)).
226 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) (“[T]he threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to
negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent holder’s true economic contribution.”); cf.
Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent Reme-
dies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 555 (2008) (“If internet telephony is actually superior to
traditional landline technology, the public may have been disserved by an injunction even
in the presence of direct competition.”); David P. Kohn, The Split: Constitutional and Policy
Bases for Establishing Separate U.S. Patent Courts, 16 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 115, 131 (2012)
(“Unpredictability causes patent defendants to fear the outcomes of litigation, even in
cases when the law may be on their side.  Patent trolls have used this unpredictability as
leverage to force monetary settlements, and thereby fund their future activities.”).
227 See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
228 See Meurer, supra note 41, at 512 (“[A]nti-competitive lawsuits . . . exclude the
defendant from the market completely . . . .”); Kevin Werbach, Connections: Beyond Univer-
sal Service in the Digital Age, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 67, 89–90 (2009) (“Vonage had
business problems unrelated to the patent litigation, but the fact that it was the company
targeted by patent-holders raises the possibility that the patents are being used anti-com-
petitively.  In the early days of telephony, AT&T used its patents over key technologies for
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Of course, Vonage’s story is just one, and it may not be illustrative of
suits by large, practicing entities against smaller competitors.  One fact is cer-
tain, however: the prevalence of large company-small company suits is not
low.  In a study by Jay Kesan and Gwendolyn Ball of U.S. patent infringement
actions, roughly 25% of the cases were filed by a plaintiff that was substan-
tially larger than the defendant.229  In order to assess whether these suits
present a serious public policy problem, a comprehensive determination and
analysis of the outcomes and effects of such suits is needed.  Only further
work can decidedly answer whether these suits truly present a systemic “pat-
ent bully” problem.  In the meantime—much like the “patent troll” prob-
lem—we are left mainly with anecdote to fashion policy.230
long-distance transmission to maintain its dominance over independent carriers.  The cur-
rent VoIP situation bears some similarities to that behavior.” (footnote omitted)); Timothy
B. Lee, Vonage is the Latest Victim of Patent Abuse, AM. ENTER. INST. (Apr. 24, 2007), http://
www.american.com/archive/2007/april-0407/vonage-is-the-latest-victim-of-patent-abuse
(stating that the U.S. patent system “seems to allow a deep-pocketed incumbent to drive an
innovative competitor out of business”).
229 See Ball & Kesan, supra note 41, at 32 tbl.3.  Another study found that 8% of suits in
the hardware, software, and financial sectors fit a potential “predation” profile, specifically
suits by “public or large companies” against a “small” private company.  Chien, supra note
1, at 1603 tbl.5.  However, this study underestimated the total percentage of potentially
predatory suits, because “large” companies were limited to those earning more than $100
million in revenue per year and “small” companies to those earning less than $10 million
per year, and additionally excluded all small, publicly traded defendant suits. Id. at 1614.
230 See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 560 (2010)
(“[D]espite a wealth of anecdote and speculation about patent trolls, there still seems a
dearth of empirical evidence that licensor patentees systematically behave abusively.”);
Milone, supra note 223, at 43 (“One of the problems with today’s debate over patent trolls
is that all too often it is driven by anecdote rather than by fact and careful analysis and also
evinces a troubling lack of historical perspective.”).
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